Abstract. Discrete log based identi cation and signature schemes are well-suited to identity proof and signature generation, but not suitable for veri cation, by smart cards, due to their highly asymmetric computational load between the prover/signer and the veri er. In this paper, we present very e cient and practical protocols for fast veri cation in these schemes, where the veri er with limited computing power performs its computation fast with the aid of the powerful prover/signer. The proposed protocols require very small amounts of computation and communication. The prover/signer only needs to perform a few modular exponentiations in real-time and the two interacting parties only need to communicate a few long numbers. Using the proposed prover-aided veri cation (PAV) protocol, the veri er can perform the Schnorr-like identi cation scheme almost as fast as the Guillou-Quisquater scheme. We generalize the PAV protocol into the signer-aided veri cation (SAV) protocol, which can be used for veri cation of any public function.
Introduction
Based on zero-knowledge proof techniques, a lot of identi cation and digital signature schemes have been developed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Among them, Schnorr-like schemes [4] [5] [6] are particularly attractive for use in smart cards or other environments with limited computing power, since the prover/signer needs almost no realtime computation with preprocessing/precomputation techniques 4,7-9]. However, veri cation requires exponentiation involving a lot of multiplications, which is disadvantageous compared to Fiat-Shamir-like schemes [1] [2] [3] . This asymmetric computational load may restrict applications of these schemes, when implemented on a weak power device such as a smart card, into environments where only one-way proofs are su cient. Thus what is further desired for these schemes would be that proofs in the other way are also e cient for smart card implementations. This motivated us to develop methods for speeding up the computation by the veri er in some way or another.
We rst considered the applicability of the server-aided approach to secret computation, rst proposed by Matsumoto et al. 10] and since then widely studied by many researchers [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , to the public veri cation of identity proofs and signatures. And we found a related work performed by Yen and Laih 16] , but unfortunately their protocol can be easily shown to be insecure. Furthermore, this kind of protocols seems to need too much amount of communication to be practical for smart card applications. There are fundamentally di erent requirements for the server-aided secret computation protocol and the server-aided public veri cation protocol. The former has to guarantee the security of the involved secret information, while the latter requires the assurance of the integrity of computation results returned from the server. This di erence of requirements seems make the latter protocol needlessly complicated and hard to guarantee the correctness of the required veri cation.
In this paper we propose e cient protocols for speeding up the veri cation of identity proofs and signatures. The key idea is to use the precomputation based on a xed base element and then mirror the action of the prover/signer. In the proposed protocols, we assume that the proving/signing terminal is much more powerful than the verifying device so that it can perform several exponentiations in real-time. This situation will commonly arise in a smart card based system when a powerful terminal proves to a smart card or when signature veri cation is performed on a smart card. Thus the resulting protocols may be called as prover/signer-aided veri cation (PAV/SAV) protocols since the veri er performs the required veri cation fast by borrowing the computing power of the prover/signer.
Compared to the protocol for server-aided RSA computation, our proposed protocols are much more e cient and practical since only a few long numbers need to be exchanged and only a few modular exponentiations need to be performed by the prover/signer. For example, using the proposed prover-aided veri cation (PAV) protocol, the veri er can execute the Schnorr-like identi cation scheme 4-6] almost as fast as the Guillou-Quisquater scheme 2], only with exchange of one long number and without loss of security. This will make Schnorrlike identi cation schemes much more attractive for smart card implementations since now smart cards can also perform the required veri cation fast. By generalizing the PAV protocol, we also present a signer-aided veri cation (SAV) protocol with which the veri er can check the validity of signatures with any desired convincing probability. For example, if a convincing probability of 1 ? 2 ?t is acceptable in a real-time protocol, a signature generated by Schnorr's scheme can be veri ed in about 3t multiplications on average. Finally we show that the proposed techniques can be used for veri cation of any public function by presenting a fully generalized version of the server-aided veri cation protocol.
2 Prover-Aided Veri cation of Identity Throughout this paper, we will use the following conventions, unless otherwise stated. Let p and q be two large public primes such that q divides p ? 1 and g be an element of order q in Z p . We denote the bit-length of p (q, resp.) by n (l, resp.) (i.e., jpj = n; jqj = l). Let (s; v) be the secret and public key pair of the prover/signer, where v = g ?s mod p with s 2 Z q . We assume that precomputation of random powers to the xed base g is performed in advance and thus does not take time during the protocol execution.
The computation of a x b y mod p with jxj = l and jyj = t is assumed to be carried out by the square-and-multiply algorithm with a precomputed value of ab mod p (see 4]). We assume that the most signi cant bits of the exponents, x and y, are always one for completeness, though their e ect on the performance is negligible. Then the above computation can be completed in 1:5l +0:25(t?1) multiplications for l > t, and 1:75l?0:75 for l = t, on average. Multiplication will always denote multiplication mod p and multiplication mod q will be neglected when counting the number of multiplications.
PAV Protocol for Schnorr's Identi cation Scheme
The following is the ve-move protocol for prover-aided veri cation in Schnorr's identi cation scheme 4]. Here t is a parameter that determines the security level of the identi cation scheme, usually lying between 20 and 40. 0) (Preprocessing) The prover picks a random number r 2 Z q and computes x = g r mod p. Similarly the veri er computes z = g ?K mod p with randomly chosen K over Z q .
1) The prover sends x to the veri er.
2) The veri er randomly picks an integer e 2 0; 2 t ) and sends it to the prover.
3) The prover computes and sends y = r + se mod q.
4) The veri er randomly picks an integer k 2 0; 2 t ), computes and sends u = (K + y)k ?1 mod q. 5) The prover computes w = g u mod p and sends it back to the veri er. 6) Finally the veri er checks if the following equation holds :
Note that for security the precomputed value z should not be revealed to the prover at least until the protocol is completed. This must be observed in every protocol presented in this paper. If desired, the computation of k ?1 mod q in step 4) may be performed in the preprocessing stage. Steps 1) -3) exactly correspond to the original Schnorr scheme whose veri cation equation equals x = g y v e mod p: (2) On the other hand, steps 4) -6) correspond to the protocol in which the veri er computes g y mod p with the aid of the prover. Thus we can see that by borrowing the prover's computing power the veri er can reduce the computational load of l bit exponentiation to that of t bit exponentiation.
Security : Equation (1) shows that the values of x; v and e, which are determined in the rst half of the protocol, cannot be modi ed, without knowledge of k, in the latter half. On the other hand, the value of u, which is the only data available to the prover for extracting information on the secret number k, releases no information on k since even z is not available at this point. As a result, the prover may guess k but has no way to verify its guess. The above two facts show that the PAV protocol is unconditionally sound since no information on k is released in the Shannon-theoretic sense and since without knowing k the dishonest prover cannot convince the veri er with more than guessing probability.
There may be a slight advantage on the prover's side. Throughout the whole protocol, the prover is given two chances of cheating the veri er : either by guessing e in step 1) as in the original Schnorr scheme or by guessing k in step 5). The latter guess can be successful independently of the former guess since, once the former is turned out to be wrong from the response of step 2), the prover knows how to manipulate w to pass the veri cation of step 6), of course, under the assumption that its guess at k is correct. Thus the added steps 4) and 5) only give the prover another chance of random guessing. This will be of little value to the (dishonest) prover. Consequently, we conclude that the proveraided approach to fast veri cation preserves almost the same security level of the original scheme.
E ciency : The veri er can check the veri cation equation (1) in about 1:75t+ 0:25 multiplications on average. This is almost the same amount of computation as is required in the GQ scheme. Note that with the original veri cation equation (2), about 1:5l + 0:25(t? 1) multiplications are required. For example, with l = 160 and t = 20, the equality of equation (1) can be checked in 35.25 multiplications, while validating equation (2) requires 244.75 multiplications, on average. Thus about 210 multiplications can be saved in this case using the proposed veri cation protocol.
The above e ciency is obtained only by increasing the number of communication bits by n+l. The computational complexity imposed on the prover is also very small, just one exponentiation (1:5(l ? 1) multiplications on average). No restriction on the computing power of the prover will be necessary due to this increase of computational amount, since such computation can be carried out in real-time even on the PC (personal computer). Therefore, in typical smart card-based systems, we will be able to obtain great computational advantage using the PAV protocol only with a small increase of communication.
PAV Protocol for Brickell-McCurley's Scheme
Brickell and McCurley 5] modi ed the Schnorr scheme in order to enhance the security at the cost of more computation and communication. The basic di erences are that all exponents are selected and computed modulo p?1 rather than modulo q and that q is kept secret from the users (so the modulus p should be chosen such that p?1 is hard to factor). The resulting protocol can be proven to be secure, assuming that p ? 1 is hard to factor, and remains as secure as the Schnorr scheme even if p ? 1 is factored.
The PAV protocol for the Brickell-McCurley (BM) scheme is the same as that for the Schnorr scheme, except that all arithmetics on exponents should be done modulo p ? 1. Thus the performance improvement by the PAV protocol is much more drastic in this scheme. For example, with n = 512 and t = 20, the original veri cation requires 772.75 multiplications on average, while the proveraided veri cation still requires 35.25 multiplications. This amounts to more than a twenty four-fold improvement. Since main disadvantage of the BM scheme can be eliminated with the PAV protocol, the BM scheme may be preferred to the Schnorr scheme in view of security.
We nally would like to mention that the PAV protocol does not a ect the provable security of the original scheme since no additional information on the secret key of the prover is involved in the prover-aided veri cation part. Note that a three-move identi cation scheme is said to be secure (in the sense of FeigeFiat-Shamir 17]) if the protocol execution releases no useful information on the prover's secret.
PAV Protocol for Okamoto's Scheme
Okamoto 6] has proposed another modi cation of Schnorr's scheme with the feature of provable security. Since it is somewhat di erent from the Schnorr scheme in basic construction, we describe his scheme together with the proposed veri cation protocol. Let p and q be as before and g 1 and g 2 be elements of order q in Z p . The public key of the prover in the Okamoto scheme is v = g ?s1 1) The prover sends x to the veri er.
3) The prover computes y 1 = r 1 + s 1 e mod q and y 2 = r 2 + s 2 e mod q and sends them to the veri er.
4) The veri er randomly picks k 2 0; 2 t ), computes u 1 = (K 1 + y 1 )k ?1 mod q and u 2 = (K 2 + y 2 )k ?1 mod q, and sends them back to the prover. 5) The prover computes w = g u1 1 g u2 2 mod p and sends it to the veri er. 6) Finally the veri er checks if the following equation holds :
Though the Okamoto scheme is somewhat di erent from the Schnorr scheme, we can see that the performance of the PAV protocol remains almost the same. Compare the above equation (3) with the original veri cation equation : x = g y1 1 g y2 2 v e mod p (4) The only di erence is that in the above the veri er computes g y1 1 g y2 2 mod p as w k z mod p with the aid of the prover. Note that it is unnecessary to use di erent values of k to compute u 1 and u 2 due to the involvement of distinct random secrets, K 1 and K 2 , of l bit size (In any case, knowing one small random secret will be su cient to cheat the veri er). Table 1 below summarizes the performance of three identi cation schemes and their PAV versions. The certi cate for the public key v is not taken into account when counting the number of communication bits and the computational amounts for preprocessing are also excluded. The number of multiplications is counted for the average case. Finally, note that we are using the parameters n; l and t as n = jpj; l = jqj and t = jej = jkj, respectively. Table 1 . Performance of PAV protocols for three identi cation schemes Finally we note that the proposed PAV protocol can also be adapted for identi cation schemes with composite moduli. For example, in Girault's modi cation of the Schnorr scheme based on composite discrete logarithms 18], the order of the based element g is made public and thus the PAV protocol for Schnorr's scheme can be applied directly. On the other hand, in the similar protocol using the self-certi ed public key 19], the based element g has a maximal order modulo a composite and the signature component y is not reduced modulo any number. Thus it is not feasible to compute multiplicative inverses of exponents. For this scheme, the veri er may rst raise both sides of the veri cation equation to the k-th power and then apply the PAV protocol (or it may use the protocol to be presented in section 3). Of course, the performance will be somewhat degraded in this case.
Signer-Aided Veri cation of Signatures
There exists the same asymmetry of computational load in digital signature schemes derived from identi cation schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem. Thus these signatures are easy to generate but hard to verify with smart cards. This section is devoted to developing an e cient protocol for signeraided veri cation of signatures. Of course, the role of the powerful server need not be assumed by the signer itself in this case. Since typical application of this protocol will be signature veri cation on the smart card, the server may be a powerful terminal with which the smart card interacts.
We only explain the proposed SAV protocol with Schnorr's signature scheme, but it can be used for veri cation of other signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem as well (e.g., see [20] [21] [22] [23] for generalized ElGamal-type signature schemes and their message recovery variants). In fact, the proposed technique can be applied to server-aided veri cation of any public function, as will be illustrated in the next section.
SAV Protocol for Schnorr's Signature Scheme
For the moment, let us suppose that the signer's public key v = g ?s mod p is globally known and frequently used (this may be the case if we have to frequently verify signatures of some central authorities). Then we can adapt the PAV protocol into the SAV (signer-aided veri cation) protocol as follows, where h denotes a one-way hash function producing randomly and uniformly c-bit digests (see below). 0) (Preprocessing) The veri er computes z = g ?K1 v ?K2 mod p with K 1 ; K 2 2 Z q . 1) The signer sends the signature fx; y; mg to the veri er, where x = g r mod p and y = r + se mod q with e = h(x; m).
2) The veri er computes e = h(x; m). Then it randomly picks an integer k 2 (0; 2 t ], computes u 1 = (K 1 +y)k ?1 mod q and u 2 = (K 2 +e)k ?1 mod q, and sends them to the signer.
3) The signer computes and sends w = g u1 v u2 mod p. 4) The veri er then checks if x = w k z mod p holds. If the check succeeds, the veri er accepts and stores fe; yg as a valid signature for message m.
We rst want to note that the length of hash-values used in any signature schemes should be at least 128 bits, contrary to the minimal length of 64 or 72 bits that many researchers (e.g., see 1,2,4]) suggested. This is because the signer can nd two di erent messages with the same signature using the birthday paradox if short hash-values are used. If such a thing is feasible, then the signer may deny later the signature of one message by presenting the other message with the same signature. This situation is essentially the same, as far as the legality of signature is concerned, as the case where an outside attacker nds two di erent messages with the same hash-value, obtains a signature for the message favorable to the signer and then claims that the signer signed the other message favorable to himself.
A slight modi cation may achieve the same e ect that can be obtained by the use of longer hash-values without increasing the computational load of the veri er, but this does not matter in the current SAV protocol. From now on, we will assume that hash-values are randomly distributed over Z q (i.e., c = l = jqj) as in the DSS 24].
The above SAV protocol achieves a security level of 2 ?t . The signer cannot use in step 3) a value of v di erent from the one publicly known or sent in step 1), due to its involvement in the computation of z. Other security considerations are the same as in the PAV protocol. Thus, a fake signature can be made to be accepted only when the guess of k is correct. If a false acceptance with probability of 10 ?6 can be tolerated in a real-time protocol, then the signature can be veri ed in 29.5 multiplications on average. However, this protocol seems not practical in general, since the precomputation using the signer's public key is not possible in most cases. Thus the above SAV protocol needs to be augmented by somewhat di erent technique.
The problem we are faced with is to compute the part v e mod p of the veri cation equation x = g y v e mod p with the aid of the signer, where the signer's public key v is assumed to vary in every run of the protocol. Our solution is to blind the public key v by raising to the k-th power and then multiplying by a random power of g, i.e., form u = g K v k mod p ( K 2 Z q ; k 2 (0; 2 t ]), so that the signer, no matter how powerful it is, cannot deduce k from u (and thus cannot modify v) with more than the guessing probability of 2 ?t . For this, the veri er must compute v k mod p before beginning the signer-aided veri cation, which increases the veri er's computational load almost twice compared to the above case. The following is the nal SAV protocol for Schnorr's signature scheme. 0) (Preprocessing) The veri er computes z 1 = g ?K1 mod p and z 2 = g ?K2 mod p with K 1 ; K 2 2 Z q . 1) The signer sends the signature fx; y; mg to the veri er, where x = g r mod p and y = r + se mod q with e = h(x; m).
2) The veri er randomly picks an integer k 2 (0; 2 t ] and computes u 1 = z 1 v k mod p using the signer's public key v. The veri er also computes u 2 = (K 2 + ky + K 1 e) mod q with e = h(x; m) and sends u 1 and u 2 to the signer.
3) The signer computes and sends w = u e 1 g u2 mod p. 4) Finally the veri er checks that x k = wz 2 mod p. If the equation holds, the veri er accepts and stores fe; yg as a valid signature for message m.
The above veri cation is based on the following identity :
x k = (g ?K1 v k ) e g K2+K1e+ky g ?K2 mod p (5) Note that since the value of e computed as e = h(x; m) by the veri er is embedded in u 2 , it is of no use for the signer to use a di erent value of e when computing w in step 3). The on-line computational load for the veri er is about 3t?1 multiplications on average. Thus, with a convincing probability of 1?10 ?6 , the veri er can validate a signature in 59 multiplications on average. This is a substantial improvement over direct veri cation requiring about 279.25 multiplications, if a small probability of false acceptance can be tolerated. If more strict veri cation is required, we may choose t = 30, in which case the signature can be veri ed in 89 multiplications with probability of false acceptance of 10 ?9 .
It is interesting to note that the SAV protocol may be viewed as an interactive proof system for language membership 25] , though the proof is trivial, where the language L consists of a set of valid signatures generated with the Schnorr scheme, i.e. L = f(x; y; m; v)jx = g y v e mod p with e = h(x; m)g:
In the SAV protocol, the veri er with limited computing power wants to be convinced that a given instance belongs to L. The above discussion shows that the SAV protocol satis es the two conditions of an IP system, completeness and soundness.
The following table shows the performance of the proposed SAV protocol for Schnorr's signature scheme. Here we assume that the hash-value e is of l bit size. The message m and the public key certi cate are not included in the number of communication bits. 
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where k i 's are random numbers of t-bit size chosen by the veri er. The parameter t determines the level of con dence for batch veri cation. We rst explain a method for e ciently evaluating the left-hand side of equation (6) using the idea from 8]. It can be computed by arranging the N terms of small powers into a groups consisting of b terms, preparing all products of possible combinations among b terms in each group and then applying the squareand-multiply algorithm. We can then show that the required computation can be completed in Table 3 below summarizes, for some selected parameters, the numbers of multiplications and storage required for the computation of the left-hand side of equation (6) using this method. From the table, we can see that if the verifying device is equipped with su cient storage, a number of signatures can be veri ed with great e ciency. Batch veri cation on the PC may be such a case. For example, 16 signatures generated by the same signer can be validated in about 464 multiplications on average, where t = 30 is assumed and 279.25 multiplications for computing the right-hand side of equation (6) Table 3 . Resource requirements for computing the left-hand side of equ. (6) Now, let us consider the batch veri cation on the smart card. Since typical smart cards under current technology do not have much storage, a relatively small number of signatures can be processed at a time. In this case, the computation of the right-hand side of equation (6) 
If it holds, the veri er accepts and stores fe i ; y i g as valid signatures for messages m i for i = 1; 2; ; N. The above batch veri cation is based on the following identity :
Using the above batch SAV protocol, the veri er can compute the right-hand side of equation (6) so. Note that if di erent signers are involved, each signer's public key must be blinded individually and thus the performance will be degraded. But this is also the case for direct veri cation. The batch SAV protocol has one undesirable property, compared to the SAV protocol of the previous subsection, in the sense that its security is dependent upon the computing power of the signer. That is, for small N, the signer may try to nd the random secret numbers k i 's from the value of u 2 by an exhaustive search using the birthday paradox. This is clearly undesirable but seems inevitable due to the involvement of secret numbers in the exponent of v.
From the equation u 2 k 0 + P N=2 i=1 k i e i = P N i=1+N=2 k i e i mod q where we assume that N is even, k i 's can be computed in L log 2 L operations with L = 2 t(1+N=2) . For example, for N = 2 and t = 20, we have L = 2
40
. However, such an attack can be mounted only after u 2 is given. Thus it is unlikely that this attack makes any practical threat to the protocol even for the above minimal parameters, since it is infeasible to perform 2 40 operations in a second or so. Other security considerations are the same as in the SAV protocol.
Server-Aided Veri cation of General Functions
We now present a fully generalized version of server-aided veri cation protocols which can be used for veri cation of any public function. Suppose that the veri er, with the aid of a powerful server, wants to check the equality of the following general equation de ned over a nite group G :
All involved elements are assumed to be public and variable. The following protocol allows the veri er to test the equality of the above equation with a convincing probability of 1 ? 2 ?t . 0) (Preprocessing) The veri er randomly picks an element g 2 G and computes z i = g Ki with K i ; 2 G for i = 0; 1; ; N. 1) The veri er randomly picks an integer k 2 (0; 2 t ] and then computes the following values :
Then the veri er sends fg; u i ; i ; g to the server.
2) The server computes and sends the following value :
3) Finally the veri er checks if z N+1 = w holds.
The above server-aided veri cation is based on the following identity :
The element g may be globally xed and, if the group order jGj is known, all the exponents can be reduced modulo jGj . The protocol achieves a security level of 2 ?t since the only way to cheat the veri er is to guess k and manipulate y and/or x i . The number of group multiplications required of the veri er is around (1:5t?0:5)(N +1) on the average. If there are M xed elements in equation (9), this quantity can be reduced to (1:5t ? 0:5)(N ? M + 1).
All the protocols presented so far are special cases of the above protocol. Note that with t-bit randomizers (blinding factors), signature schemes involving a xed base element can be veri ed in 3t ? 1 multiplications while the other schemes such as Guillou-Quisquater 2] and Ohta-Okamoto 3] can be veri ed in about 4:5t ? 1:5 multiplications on average. Even for the GQ scheme, this is a considerable improvement over direct veri cation in case where a moderate level of con dence is su cient (e.g., 88.5 vs 223.25 for t = 20 and 128 bit hash-values).
The above server-aided approach to fast veri cation will be useful for most public key cryptographic schemes when executed between two parties with asymmetric computing power. Typical applications may be found in the interactive protocols between smart cards and terminals. Since the proposed protocol is independent of the size of exponents and its security level is independent of the server's power, the advance of cryptanalytic methods (based either on software or on hardware) will never adversely a ect its performance. Rather, the performance may be further improved in case that the size of group order is increased.
Summary and Conclusion
We have presented an elegant way to speed up the computation by the veri er in discrete logarithm-based identi cation schemes (Schnorr, Brickell-McCurley, Okamoto, etc.) , with the aid of the powerful prover. The proposed proveraided veri cation (PAV) protocol is secure and e cient : Only with a small amount of additional communication and with almost the same level of security as the original scheme, the veri er can perform the Schnorr-like identi cation scheme almost as fast as the Guillou-Quisquater scheme. In particular, the eciency of the proposed protocol is independent of the size of exponents and thus Brickell-McCurley's scheme may be preferred to the Schnorr scheme due to its enhanced security. The proposed PAV protocol will make Schnorr-like identication schemes much more attractive for smart card implementations since now smart cards can also perform the required veri cation fast.
By generalizing the PAV protocol, we have also presented a signer-aided veri cation (SAV) protocol that can be adapted for veri cation of any public function. The proposed SAV protocol is also quite e cient in both computation and communication. With a convincing probability of 1 ? 2 ?t , the validity of a signature can be checked in about 3t multiplications on average for discrete logarithm-based schemes and in about 4:5t multiplications on average for the GQ scheme. The batch SAV protocol enables more e cient veri cation of a collection of signatures.
The proposed server-aided veri cation protocol will be useful for many public key cryptographic schemes carried out between users with asymmetric computing powers. Smart card veri cation of identity proofs and signatures will be one of the most attractive application areas of the protocol. Another important application can be found in designing e cient protocols for authenticated key exchange between smart cards and servers (computers) (see 28] ).
Finally we would like to mention that if the communication cost is relatively low, we can considerably reduce the computational complexity for the SAV protocol by adapting the server-aided approach for RSA computation (e.g., see 29] ). Of course, in this case, its security relies on the computing power of the server as in the batch SAV protocol presented in this paper.
